Marcia shared your email about your brother Jim with me and thought I should write to you and share what I knew about the accident. I may not be able to answer all your questions, but I think I can fill in some of the blank spaces. I can understand your frustration in not being informed about what happened and not being able to access information about the accident. When Marcia’s brother, Major Don Jones was lost in an over water, mid-air collision her family shared that same frustration and felt the Marine Corps was not forthcoming about releasing information on Don’s accident. Don was a highly qualified, Top Gun pilot who didn’t make mistakes in the air; he was so good that his father never fully accepted that Don could even be involved in an aircraft accident. I hope I can explain about the investigation process and the military’s reporting of aircraft accidents. I will also tell you that having sadly participated in numerous investigations, the most difficult ones to solve are where you have no wreckage and no survivors, such as in both Jim’s and Don’s accidents. These reports normally include various scenarios based on limited firsthand information (eye witnesses or radio transmissions), and rarely do they come to any final, definitive conclusion. I will tell you what I remember about that day. And I assure you that I am not withholding information to protect the institution. No cover-up story, no party line, and I will be as honest and forthcoming as I can.
Willy Duncan was a RIO I flew with a lot and he was a good friend. He was a superb instructor and the squadron Safety Officer at the time, responsible for keeping everyone and the aircraft they flew, safe. He was admired within the squadron and F-4 flying community known not only for his attention to detail but also for his strong emphasis on safe operations. One of the clear facts I can say to you is that Jim was flying with perhaps the best RIO in the squadron who was neither a “cowboy” nor one prone to cut corners. A new squadron pilot, such as Jim was, would normally fly exclusively with an instructor RIO for most of the training phase of (up to six months or until qualified).
Jim was fairly new to the squadron and although I had met him, I did not know him well. But the fact that he was now assigned to a front line, fleet F-4 squadron spoke a lot about him. As a new lieutenant, he was at the top of his game. He had competed well with hundreds of similar flight students in both the flying and academics to get his wings. He was assigned to F-4’s because of both his flying and tactical ability. He was already in the top 5% and where the other 95% wanted to be. I appreciate that you have taken the time in your email to tell us more about Jim, and his early years prior to joining the Marine Corps.
Aircraft Accident Investigations / Reporting
One of the common misconceptions about military aircraft investigations and reports arise from the fact that they are not released to the public and not subject to the Freedom of Information Act. Although this is very difficult for the next of kin, there is valid reason. The saving grace is that even though the accident reports are not officially published, the accident facts and conclusions do get out by word of mouth, however not always accurately. The squadron is a close knit community where secrets are rarely kept, and rumors abound. When misinformation flies, the truth as limited as it is, comes out via the chain of command so that these rumors and inaccuracies are quashed. I will tell you that the true purpose of the Accident Board is for aircraft safety, thereby preventing this type of accident from happening again, and not as generally thought, to find culpability or aircrew error. The primary objective is to determine if the cause is a mechanical defect or pilot action or procedure that has to be corrected. The recommended change in procedures or aircraft inspections is then published widely to all squadrons, but the final determination about what the accident board has concluded are not. Those conclusions are sent to the Naval Safety Center and released to other squadrons on a need to know basis. Believe it or not, one of the primary reasons for the closed dissemination, beyond the legal liability and culpability issues, is to protect the next of kin, particularly if there are conclusions about pilot error in the contributing factors. I give you a brief example from my experience. When I was an Advanced Jet flight Instructor in Kingsville TX, one of my fellow Marine flight instructors flew himself and a student into the ground at one of the target areas, both fatally injured. There was enough conclusive information from other aircraft in the bombing pattern and from radio transmissions to determine that the instructor had taken control of the aircraft when the accident occurred. The student was not married, but rumors began to fly, and the Marine instructor’s wife was unofficially informed that her husband was responsible for the accident and the death of the student. Already dealing with the loss of her husband, she was doubly devastated. Even when this “floating rumor mill” information is untrue or inaccurate it is difficult to undo the damage done. My sister in law, Kathy Jones (Don’s widow) who has since sadly passed away, went to her grave still believing many of the unfounded rumors that Don had recklessly operated his aircraft, and thereby contributed to the midair accident. Despite Marcia and my best efforts over the years, Kathy succeeded in perpetuating Don’s disregard and culpability for the accident in her three children, and although all three were very young when he died, even as adults now, the resentment for their father and how he left them still lingers.
The F-4 Phantom Aircraft
The Phantom was my primary aircraft during my 22-year USMC career. Like Jim, I flew it as a brand new Lieutenant until it was retired from the inventory in 1982. I know the aircraft well, both having flown it for over 4000 hours, but also having served as the Aircraft Maintenance Officer in three F-4 squadrons, responsible for all the inspections, maintenance and repair of all the aircraft. First off, I can tell you that because of its size and power it’s a big step up from the training aircraft that you are used to flying as a student. Over 5000 Phantoms were built, and for its time, the aircraft has an enviable safety record even in the more hazardous combat and shipboard operations. It was considered a “forgiving” aircraft in that it was known to be able to bail you out of unfavorable or slow speed situations because of its tremendous thrust to weight. However, you had to be careful with all that power when the nose of the aircraft was pointed below the horizon, because at max afterburning thrust, it could quickly become a runaway locomotive going downhill, and lose altitude very quickly. Because of this, and also allowing for sufficient altitude for spin or out of control recovery, the rules of engagement (ROE) dictated that you had to terminate all air-to-air maneuvering at 10,000 feet. This nose low acceleration may have applied to Jim’s accident, but it’s not conclusive, because they were last seen entering a cloud deck and no radio transmissions were heard. There is no way of knowing what throttle/thrust setting he had on his aircraft. However, when accelerating nose low in afterburner, the situation requires you to pull the power back quickly and initiate a wings level pull up before the Phantom accelerates quickly to an altitude where safe recovery is not possible and escape by ejection seat is even more precarious.
During all my time both flying and fixing F-4’s, I did not know of the throttle problem mentioned in your email, or any major control problem with the aircraft. Over the years, as with any tactical aircraft, mechanical problems do arise, but when these become “safety of flight” issues such as ejection seat, engine (including throttle), or control problems, the result is that all the F-4’s are grounded (not flown) until the problem is solved and the fix incorporated. When an aircraft is lost, the maintenance log books immediately become an important part of the investigation. These logs contain the entire life history of the aircraft including all inspections, previous accident/combat damage, and major airframe structural repairs. Also the most current problems (discrepancies) that are reported by pilots over the last 30-60 flights before Jim was assigned that aircraft, are reviewed thoroughly for repeat or recurring issues and what corrective action was taken to repair. As the Aircraft Maintenance Officer at the time, I would have been immediately informed about any suspect or previous problems with Jim’s aircraft. To my knowledge, I can tell you that the board did not determine that there were any structural or mechanical issues with his aircraft.
The Accident
I was already airborne when Jim took off for an air-to-air/radar intercept mission with his flight leader. As they were leaving I was in the process of concluding my hop in the same overwater Warning Area (W-291). I got the call from the squadron radio that we had possibly lost an aircraft. Jim’s flight leader (name unknown to me) had called in to activate the Search and Rescue (SAR) effort and CG helos were launched from Long Beach. By the time I got to the crash site and made contact with the rescue helo crews, they had located they large jet fuel slick and some of crash debris (one outer wing panel and part of Willy’s helmet that identified him by his call sign, Donut). The SAR commander on scene requested I remain above the cloud deck so I could relay their radio transmissions. I stayed airborne for another 20-30 minutes before returning to MCAS El Toro to refuel. Because I was able to hot refuel (without shutting down the engines), I was able to take-off in about 30 minutes and returned to the crash site. During that delay, the SAR helos continued to search for additional wreckage, life rafts or survivors. While conserving my fuel I was able to stay overhead an additional three hours. The surface search continued until dark and I believe there were surface ships that were present all through the following day although I was not in contact with them. Nothing more was recovered. When I returned to El Toro, I did talk to Jim’s flight leader and his RIO about if they heard either of the seat beepers (that transmit a beeping sound on the radio if either of the ejection seats are activated). The combination of neither beeper transmission nor life raft deployment (inflates automatically following parachute opening) is a fairly clear indication that neither ejection seat was fired in an escape attempt.
Following a month long investigation, the accident board could not come to a definitive conclusion. I did not read the final report, but I know they considered three likely scenarios based on very limited inflight information. First possibility is the high speed, nose low and accelerating flight, combined with entering a solid cloud deck and the accompanying disorientation of attempting to recover the aircraft without a visual horizon. The second, more remote possibility that recovery from the dive was accompanied by an overstress and structural failure by the aircraft. I consider this remote because it takes a tremendous amount of force to accomplish an overstress (over 9 G’s), and the G-force to pull the aircraft apart is beyond human G tolerance. Third scenario is that Jim was able to reduce power and recover the aircraft but may have departed controlled flight in an effort to pull up before entering the cloud deck. An inflight departure in the F-4 is a violent snap roll maneuver prior to entering a spin, and even with 10,000 feet and a visual horizon is a difficult and exacting recovery. In all three scenarios, the aircraft impacted the water without an ejection escape attempt.
Unfortunately there is no way to access his report at the Naval Safety Center even if it still exists, but I don’t think it would tell you more. God only knows what really happened that day.
If after reading this, you have any questions, please feel free to contact me and I will do my best. Jim, as you’ve so kindly described was a fine young man and would have made and outstanding Marine and pilot. I’m proud to have served in the squadron with him. I am so sorry for your loss.
Respectfully,
Andrew
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